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#2A-12/8/77 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE-NO. -U--2 -8-7-9— 
The charge herein was filed by the City of Troy (City)on September 14, 
1977. It alleges that the Troy Uniformed Firefighters Association, Local 2304, 
I.A.F.F. (Local 2304) violated Section 209-a.2(b) of the Taylor Law by refusing 
to negotiate in good faith, in that it improperly insisted upon the negotiation 
of two demands that are not mandatory subjects of negotiation and that it sub-
mitted the demands to,,interest arbitration on September 1, 1977. As submitted 
to the arbitrator, the demands that the City protests read: 
"The City will provide sufficient personnel to adequately 
cover all positions for the purpose of day to day assign-
ments. Such personnel shall include, but not be limited 
to, a. Captain on duty in each firehouse on each shift and 
not less than forty-two officers and firefighters (members 
of the bargaining unit) on active duty in each platoon." 
"Every piece of equipment which leaves a house in response 
to an alarm shall carry a company whose minimum strength 
shall consist of a sufficient number of officers and fire-
fighters to assure the ability of such company to safely 
carry out its duties and responsibilities. In the event 
that the City and the Union cannot agree what such comple-
"• ment of personnel shall be, resort shall be had to arbitra-
tion as provided for in Article IX, Section E." 
In its answer, Local 2.304 argues that the demands are appropriate for 
negotiation and arbitration because they are "based upon language in the 
present contract...." It states that the first demand must be negotiated 
a .<"•» o''"% 
In the Matter of 
THE TROY UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 2304, I.A.F.F. 
Respondent, 
-and-
CITY OF TROY, 
Charging Party. 
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because it "is a clarification of language in the present contract between the 
parties which, if adopted, would provide job security which the Legislature 
stated is a matter for consideration by the arbitrators." This is a reference 
to Chapter 216 of the Laws of 1977 which requires an interest arbitrator in a 
police or firefighter dispute to consider, inter alia, the terms of a previously 
negotiated agreement that deal with job security. Local 2304 contends that the 
second demand is also a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
Neither demand is a mandatory subject of negotiation and it is improper 
for Local 2304 to submit either to interest arbitration over the objections 
of the City. In deciding a prior case involving the two parties herein, we 
held that an agreement on a nonmandatory subject of negotiation does not 
obligate either party to negotiate over a demand to extend the agreement into 
a successor contract (City of Troy, 10 PERB 1(3015 [1977]). This is not 
altered by the enactment of L.77, c.216. That amendment does not expand the 
scope of negotiations. Rather, it would require an arbitrator to consider a 
job security clause in a prior contract if the clause were a mandatory subject 
of negotiation. An agreement to maintain manning levels is not. 
Local 2304's answer and supporting brief make it clear that the first 
demand is to afford job security to the employees whom it represents by 
maintaining manning levels. We have often held that a demand, the predominant 
characteristic of which related to manpower and deployment, is not a mandatory 
1 See also Matter of Board of Education of the City of New York, 5 PERB 1(3054 
(1972) and Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass Co., Chemical Workers, 505 U.S. 157 (1971). 
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subject of negotiation (City of Newburgh, 10 PERB 113001 [1977], aff'd. 
IAFF of the City of Newburgh v. Helsby, App.Div. 2d [3rd Dept. 
1977]). Moreover, this demand would require the City to assign officers of 
specified rank to each firehouse and shift, and a minimum crew of 42 officers 
and firefighters to each platoon. Similar demands were considered in City of 
White Plains, 5 PERB 1[3008 (1972), and were determined by us not to constitute 
mandatory subjects of negotiation. 
The language of the second demand is addressed not only to manpower and 
deployment, but also to employees' safety. Thus, as we said in the Newburgh 
decision (at p. 3003) : 
"We are faced with the problem of determining whether the 
predominant characteristic...is safety or whether it is 
manpower and deployment. If the former, then we must find 
it to be a mandatory subject of negotiation; if it is the 
latter, we must conclude that it is not." 
Although this implies a balancing test, in White Plains PBA, 9 PERB 113007 
(1976) we concluded that this procedure would place an unwarranted burden upon 
the collective negotiations process because it would require, as a prior con-
dition, that the negotiability of each manning/safety demand be determined by 
us after an extended factual hearing as to the balance between the two conflict-1 
ing concerns. In place of that procedure, we suggested that the parties 
"...could create a joint safety policy committee that 
operates under general guidelines that are recited in 
the contract to consider issues of safety that relate 
to manning standards. This process could be made sub-
ject to the grievance arbitration procedure." 
2_ At p. 3003 we wrote: 
"As we have found here and in other cases, the general subject of 
safety as a means of protecting employees beyond the normal hazards 
inherent in their work is a mandatory item of negotiation. Hence, 
the presence of a general safety clause in the collective bargaining 
agreement should provide a basis for testing the safety guarantee 
in individual fact situations which may arise during the life of the 
agreement by presentation of disputes in such specific situations 
for resolution through the grievance procedure." 
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We expanded on this in City of Newburgh by indicating that a safety standard 
that is designed to protect employees from dangers that are beyond the normal 
hazards inherent in their work is a mandatory item of negotiations. That 
standard could then be applied to specific situations by a joint safety policy 
committee. Problems involving the application of that standard or the control 
of such hazards could go to grievance arbitration on an ad hoc basis. 
In-City of-New-Rochelle-, 10-PERB-1f3-0-7-8-(-l-9-7-7)-^ -we-f-oun-d---th-a-t-a-uni-on--
demand relating to the safety aspects of rig manning met the test that we pro-
scribed in Newburgh and White Plains PBA. The employee organization was seek-
ing to create a general health and safety committee which would have general 
jurisdiction over all matters of safety to members of a fire department, 
"including, but not limited to the total number of employees reporting to a 
fire and the minimum number of employees to be assigned to each piece of fire-
fighting apparatus." Disagreements within the safety committee as to the 
safety aspects of any particular assignment could go to grievance arbitration. 
At issue was a broad general safety clause which, inter alia, dealt with the 
impact upon safety of rig manning in particular situations. Although we found 
that the demand was a mandatory subject of negotiation, it must be acknowledged 
that the general safety guidelines under which the safety committee would 
operate were not clearly drawn. We determined that, in the context of our 
decisions in White Plains PBA and Newburgh, the parties in negotiations or an 
arbitrator appointed pursuant to §209.4 of the Taylor Law could prescribe more 
precise standards. It was not the intent of our New Rochelle decision to 
authorize the safety committee to set general minimum manning requirements for 
a rig under the guise of a purported safety claim. Rather, that decision was 
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concerned with the authority of a safety committee to consider questions of 
safety in specific situations. Here, we have a demand that is narrowly 
directed toward the extent of rig manning itself even though it purportedly 
concerns itself with "the ability of such [fire] company to safely carry out 
its duties and responsibilities." A reading of this demand in the context of 
Local 2304's answer and brief reinforces the conclusion that its predominant 
thrust is to provide job security by requiring minimum manning. 
ACCORDINGLY, we determine that Local 2304's submission of the two 
demands to arbitration is a violation of its duty to 
negotiate in good faith, and 
WE ORDER Local 2304 to withdraw such demands from interest arbitration. 
DATED: New York, New York 
December 8, 1977 
Joseph R./Crowley 
J l^^ W-— 
Ida Klaus 
mm 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF MONROE, 
Respondent. 
-and-
LOCAL 381, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRICAL, 
RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS, MONROE COUNTY 
FEDERATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS, AFL-CiO, 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF MONROE, 
Respondent, 
-and-
LOCAL 71-71A, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF MONROE, 
Respondent, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
MONROE CHAPTER, 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2478 
CASE NO. U-2491 
CASE NO. U-2646 
The three charges herein all grow out of the same circumstances. On 
December 8, 1976, twenty-three days before the expiration, on December 31, 1976, 
of separate agreements between the County of Monroe (County) and Local 381, 
International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, Monroe County 
Federation of Social Workers, AFL-CIO (Local 381); Local 71-71A, International 
Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO (Local 71); and the Monroe Chapter of 
the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA), the County legislature 
?u 
* i* if'!* 
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adopted a resolution providing "that [effective January 1, 1977] all employees 
of the County of Monroe at a salary above $20,000 per annum shall receive a 
10% reduction from their current salary rate and employees earning between 
$12,000 and $19,999 per annum shall receive a 5% reduction from their current 
salary rate." Local 381, Local 71 and CSEA each charged that this resolution 
constituted an interference with the right of public employees to organize 
jinder._the_Taylor; Law._and_._a__ refusal._to_ negotiate in good faith, violations of 
paragraphs (a) and (d) of §209-a.l, respectively, of the Taylor Law. In each 
case, the hearing officer dismissed the charge insofar as it alleged improper 
interference with employee organizational rights and found merit in the alle-
gation that the County refused to negotiate in good faith. Local 381 also 
charged the County with unilaterally substituting, after January 1, 1977, an ad 
hoc grievance procedure for that contained in the expired agreement. The 
hearing officer determined that the County did change grievance procedures while, 
still under a duty to negotiate and that this, too, constituted a refusal to 
negotiate in good faith. The County has filed exceptions in all three cases to 
the determination that it violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law and Local 71 
has filed exceptions which argue that the remedy prescribed by the hearing 
officer was inadequate. 
Facts 
With ten months to go on the County's agreements with the three 
employee organizations, on February 24, 1976, its Manager of Labor Relations 
wrote to each of them that because "a severe financial deficit was being pro-
jected for the year 1976", he wished to meet with them "to explore the possi-
bility of alternatives to employee layoffs." Such meetings were held in March 
1976, during the course of which he proposed ten-day furloughs without pay for 
all employees during the balance of the year. This proposal was rejected by 
the three employee organizations. On June 30, 1976, the County legislature 
adopted a resolution directing the County Manager to implement the furloughs. 
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This was never done because the CSEA challenged the furloughs in court, and it 
obtained a restraining order against such action that was not vacated until 
February 1977. 
On June 12, 1976, the County's Manager of Labor Relations proposed to 
the three employee organizations that negotiations for agreements to succeed 
those due to expire at the end of the year commence in July. All three 
~declxhed to begin hegotlations""at" thattimer. Negotiations with"Local- 381- com-
menced on September 9, 1976. Negotiations with CSEA began in early October 197l>. 
Local 71 did not begin negotiations until December 17, 1976, which was after 
the adoption of the legislative resolution complained about. 
The salary cuts required by the resolution of the County legislature 
were implemented on January 1, 1977. The County's Manager of Labor Relations 
advised Local 381 that after January 1, 1977, grievances would be processed on 
1 
an ad hoc basis and not in accordance with past procedures. 
Local 381 filed its charge on January 3, 1977; the charge of Local 71 
was filed four days later. CSEA did not file its charge until April 14, 1977. 
Discussion 
The County's exceptions contest the hearing officer's conclusion that 
its action constituted a refusal to negotiate in good faith. First, it argues 
that it was privileged to cut salaries because the nature of the past rela-
tionships between it and the employee organizations did not provide any basis 
for an expectation that existing terms and conditions of employment would auto-
matically continue after the expiration of any of the contracts, absent an 
1_ The record does not indicate that the County had made any proposals at all 
to alter the preexisting grievance procedure, nor had it proposed a salary 
cut. It does not attempt to justify its action on the theory that it had 
been entitled to impose its last position. 
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agreement to extend them, and that no such agreement had been made. Second, it 
argues that the employee organizations are estopped from claiming a violation 
of §209-a.l(d) because they improperly refused to commence negotiations with 
the County in July 1976 even though they were aware that the County's fiscal 
problems necessitated an early resolution of negotiations disputes. With 
respect to the hearing officer's determination that the alteration of the grie-
jvance procedure was improper, it argues that it was sufficient under the Act 
for it to continue to meet with the employee organizations to resolve grievances 
even on an ad hoc basis, and that it did so. Finally, it argues that the 
conduct that could, in any event, be complained about occurred on December 8, 
1976, when the legislative resolution was adopted, and not on January 1, 1977, 
when it took effect. Thus, the charge of CSEA was filed more than four months 
after the occurrence of the alleged violation and is, therefore, time barred 
by §204.1(a)(1) of our Rules. 
In support of the first of its exceptions, the County alleges that, 
in the past, "there has never been an actual hiatus between agreements, since 
the parties mutually extended expired agreements in order to continue wages 
and increments pending the execution of a successor agreement." The County 
argues that there was, thus, no past practice of maintaining salary levels 
after the expiration of an agreement absent such an extension; therefore, it was 
free to cut salaries, as it did. This misapprehends prior decisions of the 
Board which looked to the parties' past practices only to ascertain whether a 
2 
disputed matter had been a term and condition of employment. Here, there is no 
1_ Those decisions involved the payment of increments, a benefit the Court of 
Appeals has determined that an employer need not continue to provide auto-
matically after the expiration of an agreement (Board of Cooperative . Edu-
cational Services of Rockland County v. New York State PERB, BOCES Staff 
Council and the New York State United Teachers, Inc., 41 N.Y. 2d 753 [1977]) 
Even before that decision, it was often difficult to determine on the facts 
of a particular case whether there was a reasonable expectation of the con-
tinuation of increments as a term and condition of employment, and that is 
why we look to the parties' past practices (e.g., County of Suffolk, 9 PERB 
1[3080 [1976]). 
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question but that salary levels and the grievance procedure had been terms and 
conditions of employment. The hearing officer stated, "The obligation to nego-
tiate in good faith requires the parties to collective negotiations to refrain 
from making unilateral changes in established terms and conditions of employ-
ment during negotiations for a new agreement." We affirm this conclusion of 
law. We do not regard the failure of the parties to execute an extension 
^agreement—as~ materia~t to-tfre~duty~to~negot±a^ 
involved. As the parties were still in the midst of negotiations, the County 
had not yet fulfilled its duty to negotiate on December 8, 1976, when the 
resolution was adopted. The timing of its action placed undue pressures upon 
the negotiators for the employee organizations. 
It is argued by the County that it did not have to await the exhaus-
tion of statutory conciliation procedures before acting unilaterally because 
those procedures were unduly delayed to its detriment by the employee organi-
zations' refusal to commence negotiations in July. Although it may be that 
the County's financial situation justified it in urging the commencement of 
negotiations at an early time and that any failure of the employee organiza-
tions to agree within a reasonable period of time to do so might have been the 
basis of an improper practice charge by the County, it is not a justification 
for the County's unilateral action in the case of Local 381 and of CSEA, both 
of which commenced negoiations well in advance of the expiration of the 
existing agreements. However, on the facts in this case, we cannot find 
merit in Local 71's charge that the County refused to negotiate with it in 
good faith on December 8, 1976. On that date, which was unreasonably long 
after it should have commenced negotiations and only three weeks before the 
expiration of the existing agreement, Local 71 was still refusing even to 
commence negotiations with the County, thereby foreclosing any reasonable 
$QOi 
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opportunity by the County to resolve its fiscal difficulties through joint 
dealings with Local 71. 
Inasmuch as we dismiss Local 71's charge, we do not reach its excep-
tions which are directed to the remedy proposed by the hearing officer. 
We also determine that the charge of CSEA was untimely. CSEA sees 
the law correctly when it states in its brief that the time in which to file 
"an-improper-p"ra"ctice~~icharge "runs^ fr"om^ th:e^ imp±ementa1r±on—of-an^ TimpTroper^ act: 
of policy and not from its announcement. However, it is less persuasive 
when it argues that the legislative resolution adopted on December 8, 1976 
merely announced a new wage policy which was not implemented until January 1, 
1977. This analysis, which would make the charge timely, is wrong. The 
legislative resolution was a definitive act and not the mere announcement 
of an intention to act. On December 8, the salary cut went into effect as 
an accomplished fact to be reflected in the ministerial act of the payment 
of reduced salaries after January 1, 1977. The resolution of December 8, 
1976 compelled the salary cut. It is that resolution—and not the actual 
issuance of reduced payroll checks which followed automatically—that consti-
tutes the violation. Therefore, the charge was not timely. 
ACCORDINGLY, WE ORDER that the charges herein of Local 71-71A. 
I.U.O.E, AFL-CIO, and of the Monroe Chapter of 
C.S.E.A., Inc. be dismissed, and 
WE FURTHER ORDER Monroe County not to institute 
unilateral changes in the terms and conditions 
of employees represented by Local 381, I.U.E., 
Monroe County Federation of Social Workers, 
4992 
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3 
AFL-CIO during the course of negotiations. 
Dated: New York, New York 
December 8, 1977 
CT&Qt- •/tj^oj^i --
Ida Klaus 
No additional relief need be ordered in this case because the parties, in 
the course of agreeing upon a contract, resolved the issues herein to their 
mutual satisfaction. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF YONKERS, 
Employer, 
-and-
SERyLCE_EMPI£YEES._IJ^ 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. C-1518 
Petitioner, 
-and-
YONKERS NON-TEACHING UNIT, CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Yonkers Non-Teaching 
Unit of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., the intervenor herein, 
from a decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representa-
tion (Director) which, inter alia, denied the intervener's motion to dismiss 
the petition of the Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO (petitioner) 
The Director had permitted the petitioner to withdraw a prior petition on 
June 29, 1977, when it had been ascertained that its showing of interest was 
1 
insufficient. On that same day, the petitioner filed a new petition which the 
Director found was supported by a sufficient showing of interest. The inter-
venor moved to dismiss the second petition in that it was barred by the first 
1_ The showing of interest had been submitted upon an assumption that the unit 
consisted of 700 employees. When a list of employees was submitted by the 
employer, it was ascertained that there were over 800 employees in the unit. 
Based upon the correct number of employees, the showing of interest was not 
sufficient. 
QQ4 
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because, 
"No petition may be filed for a unit which includes job 
titles that were within a unit for which a petition was 
filed, processed to completion and no employee organiza-
tion was certified, during the twelve-month period following 
disposition of that representation proceeding." (emphasis 
supplied) (Rules of Procedure, §201.3(g)) 
The Director denied the motion. He also refused a request of the intervenor 
that he reject the additional signatures submitted in support of the second 
petition because those signatures had been solicited in violation of an agree-
ment between the Board of Education of the City of Yonkers, the employer herein. 
and the petitioner which established access rules during the representation 
2 
contest. 
The exceptions argue that the Director erred in three particulars: 
1. His determination that the first petition was not supported by a sufficient 
showing of interest was a processing of the petition "to completion"; there-
fore he should have rejected the second petition because it was not timely. 
2. He should not have notified the petitioner ex parte that the showing of 
interest in support of its first petition was insufficient and he should 
have given the intervenor prior notice that he would permit the petitioner 
to withdraw that petition. 
3. He should have accepted the intervener's evidence supporting its claim that 
the additional signatures on the second petition were solicited in 
violation of the access rules and should have disqualified those signatures 
on the basis of such evidence. 
2^  The agreement was in settlement of two improper practice charges filed by 
the petitioner against the employer. The intervenor was not a named party 
in either case. It made - but withdrew - a motion to intervene in one of 
them. It did not participate in the settlement discussions. 
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DISCUSSION 
Having reviewed the record and considered the arguments of the parties, 
we affirm the Director's findings of fact and conclusions of law. The 
intervenor misapprehends the nature of and the reason for the requirement of 
a showing of interest. The requirement of a showing of interest is to permit 
this Board to screen out those cases in which there is no showing of a sub-
stantial support of the petitioner by the employees, so that public funds will 
not be needlessly expended in the investigation and processing of those cases. 
It is not designed to protect an incumbent employee organization and, in any 
event, is not a requirement of the Taylor Law. Thus, in one instance, we 
found a local law establishing a mini-PERB to be substantially equivalent to 
the Taylor Law even though it required a 10% showing of interest to support 
a petition rather than the 30% that we require (Matter of AFSCME Council 66, 
4 PERB 1(3063 [1971]). In another instance we found that a mini-PERB could 
accept designation cards that were filed after the petition was submitted 
(Matter of Westchester CSEA, 7 PERB 113067 [1974]). Because the requirement 
of a showing of interest is essentially an internal administrative means of 
avoiding unnecessary work for this agency, we have stated in our Rules 
(at §201.4(c)) that, "The determination by the Director as to the timeliness 
of a showing of interest and of its numerical sufficiency is a ministerial act 
and will not be reviewed by the Board." This policy of deferring to the 
Director when he determines that a showing of interest is sufficient has been 
sustained by the courts (Matter of CSEA v. Helsby, 63 Misc. 2d 403 [Suffolk 
County, 1970], aff'd 35 App.Div. 2d 755 [2nd Dept., 1970]). In its opinion, 
the lower court cited Federal court decisions under the National Labor 
Relations Act (at p. 405) in support of the proposition that disputes regarding 
the sufficiency of a showing of interest can be resolved by the election "which 
better decides the substantive issues whether or not the [union] or another 
labor organization, if any, actually represents a majority of the employees 
Board - C-1518 -4 
involved in a representation case." 
On this reasoning, we reject so much of the intervener's exceptions as 
relate to the sufficiency of the showing of interest. We also reject the 
argument that the second petition was barred by §201.3(g) of our Rules because 
the prior petition had been processed to completion. It was not. The prior 
petition was withdrawn before completion of agency action upon it. Further-
~aore",~we'"''conclude"'"'th~at" the "Director did not "'e'r'r~in permitting petitioner to 
withdraw its petition. We find no substantial prejudice to the intervenor 
3^  
because of this withdrawal. 
Accordingly, the exceptions herein are dismissed and the decision of 
the Director is affirmed, and 
WE ORDER that the employer shall submit to the Director, the petitioner 
and the intervenor, within seven days from the date of receipt 
of this decision, an alphabetized list of employees in the 
negotiating unit set forth in the decision of the Director who 
were employed on the payroll date immediately preceding the 
date of this decision. 
DATED: New York, New York 
December; 8,19.77. 
,
mm/[ e 
Joseph' R. Crowley / 
Ida Klaus 
_3 To the same effect, under the National Labor Relations Act see General 
Dynamics Corp., 175 NLRB #155, 71 LRRM 1166 (1969). 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NYACK TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Upon the Charge of Violation of 
§210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. D-0125 
On January 30, 1976, we determined that the Nyack Teachers Association 
violated §210.1 of the Taylor Law in that it engaged in a strike during 
October and November 1975 (see 9 PERB 1(3016) . We ordered that 
"the dues deduction privileges of the Nyack Teachers Association 
be suspended indefinitely, commencing on the first practicable 
date, provided that the Nyack Teachers Association may apply to 
this Board at any time after August 15, 1977 for the restoration 
of such dues deduction privileges, such application to be on 
notice to all interested parties and supported by proof of good 
faith compliance with subdivision one of Section 210 of the Civil 
Service Law since the violation herein found, such proof to include, 
for example, the successful negotiation, without a violation of 
said subdivision, of a contract covering the employees in the unit 
affected by the violation, and accompanied by an affirmation that 
it no longer asserts the right to strike against any government 
as required by the provisions of Civil Service Law §201.3(g)." 
On October 5, 1977 the Nyack Teachers Association applied for 
restoration of its dues checkoff privileges. The application was on notice 
to the employer and contained an affirmation that the Nyack Teachers Association 
"no longer asserts the right to strike against any government." The employer 
does not contest the restoration of dues checkoff privileges of the Nyack 
Teachers Association. 
The Nyack Teachers Association has not yet demonstrated its good faith 
compliance with subdivision one of Section 210 of the Civil Service Law by the 
successful negotiation of an agreement. It is presently in negotiation for an 
agreement to succeed one that expired on June 30, 1977. The contract being 
^99£ 
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negotiated will be the first new contract between the parties since our 
decision imposing the dues check-off forfeiture. The Nyack Teachers Associa-
tion has not threatened to strike during the1, course of these negotiations. 
Consequently, there is reason to believe at this time that it does not intend 
to strike or to threaten to strike before the completion of negotiations. 
NOW, THEREFORE, We suspend the forfeiture of the dues deduction 
privileges of the Nyack Teachers Association as 
ordered on January 30, 1976, which suspension shall 
be subject, however, to revocation in the event of a 
strike or a strike threat. The Nyack Teachers 
Association may apply for full restoration of its 
dues deduction privileges upon the successful 
negotiation of a contract in the unit affected by 
the violation. 
Dated; New York, New York 
December 8, 1977 
seph R. Crowley 
AX>UsL*i 
Ida Klaus 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WAVERLY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
¥AVERLY_ TMCHERS...ASSOCIATION,... 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NOS. U-2271 & U-2312 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Waverly Teachers 
Association (WTA) from so much of the decision of a hearing officer as dis-
misses its charge that the Waverly Central School District (District) violated 
§209-a.l(a), (c) and (d) of the Taylor Law by unilaterally establishing job 
descriptions for four positions and by refusing to execute the 1975-76 agree-
ment because' WTA had not withdrawn a grievance that was scheduled for arbitra-
tion. WTA also excepts to the hearing officer's dismissal of its charge that 
the District's refusal to pay annual increments or to continue other contractual 
benefits after the expiration of the 1975-76 agreement was a violation of the 
Taylor Law. Finally, the exceptions argue that the hearing officer erred in 
determining that the District violated only §209-a.l(d) when it refused to take 
part in factfinding on the basis of the 1975-76 agreement, and when it refused 
to process grievances during negotiations for a successor for the 1975-76 agree-
ment. It argues that the record supports a finding that this conduct also 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (c). 
The exception directed at the District's refusal to pay increments or 
to continue other contractual benefits after the expiration -of the 1975-76 
agreement must be dismissed as a matter of law. Since the filing of the excep-
tions, the New York State Court of Appeals has determined that the Taylor Law 
O f> o 
Board - U-2271 & U-2312 -2 
does not require a public employer to pay increments after the expiration of an 
agreement (BOCES, Rockland County v, NYS PERB, et al., 41 NY 2d 753 [1977]). 
WTA also asserts that the predecessor agreement contained a continuation 
clause,' which has the effect of continuing the schedule of increments, and 
that this violation of the agreement constitutes a unilateral change in terms 
and conditions of employment. This, too, fails to set forth a violation of 
the Taylor Law; in St. Lawrence County, 10 PERB 1f3058 (1977) , we ruled that a 
question about what the terms of agreement mean must be resolved through the 
grievance procedures that the parties have set up to interpret collective 
agreements. 
The disposition of the other exceptions depends upon the interpreta-
tion of the evidence in the record. We have, therefore, reviewed the existing 
1 
record with particular diligence, and we determine that it supports the hearing 
officer's findings of fact. The District promulgated job descriptions for 
four positions on August 12, 1976. The four positions are: Majorette Super-
visor, Director of Junior High Band Activities, Director of Vocal Music 
Activities and Director of Instrumental Music Activities. Five days later, the 
WTA made a demand to negotiate over the job descriptions, and the District 
refused. WTA argues that the job description alters the job content of the 
four positions and that the District is required to negotiate over its demand. 
For the proposition that an employer must negotiate before it changes 
the job content of current employees, WTA relies upon Scarsdale PBA, 8 PERB 
1(3075 (1975). In that case, we decided that an employer must negotiate over a 
demand made by the PBA that policemen not be required to repair patrol vehicles 
We said (at p. 3033), "that job content of current employees is a mandatory 
_1 Unfortunately, the original record was lost "in transit from Albany to the 
New York City Office of the Board. The parties have replaced the steno-
graphic minutes of the hearing and those exhibits upon which they relied. 
They have both indicated their willingness to have the case decided upon 
the materials that are in the possession of the Board. 
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subject of negotiations so long as the negotiations demand would not narrow 
the inherent nature of the employment involved." (emphasis supplied) That 
language must be read in the context of the issue there presented and decided; 
namely, that it is mandatory for an employer to negotiate as to a demand by a 
labor organization that employees be relieved of an assignment which is not an 
essential aspect of their basic employment function or of its related inci-
dental tasks. We did not find that the content of job descriptions character-
~izing~the~e~ss~entra^ ^ 
of particular employment categories or positions is a mandatory subject of 
negotiations. We do not believe that it is. Here, the evidence shows that each 
of the job descriptions established by the District covered the essential 
duties and functions of the particular position, i.e., instruction. We note, 
moreover, that three of the job descriptions did not change the essential 
duties and functions of the jobs covered. The fourth was a newly created 
position established pursuant to a stipulation in settlement of an improper 
practice charge and the job description was promulgated simultaneously with 
its creation. 
In any event, the right of a public employer to modify its operation 
by changing the assignments of its employees in ways that do not add duties 
beyond the essential character, and its related incidental tasks, of those 
jobs, whether it be instruction or police protection or other basic functions, 
does not relieve it of an obligation to negotiate should the employee organiza-
tion make a demand relating to the impact of such a change upon terms and 
conditions of employment. Moreover, that right is not properly exercised 
if the employer's real reason for making what would have otherwise have been 
a permissible change in job assignments is to undermine statutory rights of 
employees. WTA argues that this was the case here. Three of the four posi-
tions had been the subject of grievances, and the fourth had been involved 
in an improper practice charge. WTA contends that they were singled out for 
mm 
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job descriptions in order to discourage the filing of grievances and improper 
practice charges. However, the District's promulgation of the job descriptions 
for the four positions involved in grievances and in the improper practice 
charge may be explained as having been occasioned by a desire to clarify the 
confusion that precipitated those grievances and the improper practice charge. 
On the record, as a whole, we do not find that the District's intention was 
to deprive employees of their rights of organization or representation. 
The record indicates that the Superintendent of Schools declined to 
execute the 1975-76 agreement before August 13, 1976 for three reasons. One 
was that he had not yet read the draft of the agreement submitted to him. 
Another was that the parties had also agreed, as part of the total settlement, 
that an improper practice charge would be withdrawn and that he was awaiting 
notification of its withdrawal. He received that notification on August 11. 
Two days later he signed the agreement, after correcting "clerical errors" 
in the document submitted to him. A third reason—which is the basis of the 
exceptions—is that on August 2, 1976, he was awaiting proof of withdrawal 
of a claim in arbitration which the parties, as part of the settlement, agreed 
would be withdrawn. In fact, when on August 13 he executed the agreement, 
the arbitration had not yet been withdrawn. This conduct of the Superintendent 
of Schools of the District was not an improper practice. It appears that the 
settlement of the entire dispute included agreement upon a contract and 
withdrawal of the improper practice charge and the grievance. If so, they 
were all related and conditioned upon one another. Even if they were not, 
the Superintendent's refusal to execute an agreement before he had a reasonable 
opportunity to read it was not improper. We do not agree that "but for" 
the outstanding grievance, he would have executed the agreement before 
August 13, 1976. 
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WTA asks us to infer, from conduct that it alleged to be improper 
but we have here found not to be improper, that the District intended to 
interfere with the organizational and representational rights of employees 
when it refused to take part in factfinding on the basis of the 1975-76 
agreement or to process grievances during negotiations for a successor to 
that agreement, the two particulars in which the hearing officer found that 
~the~"District: violated~§209=arlCd)- of t h e ~ A c ^ — 
no exceptions. The conduct itself, not being improper, carries no implication 
that the District was improperly motivated in those actions that violated 
§209-a.l(d) and there is no other evidence to support the allegation of 
improper motivation. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the exceptions herein be, and they 
hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
December 8, 1977 
& 
eph R. Crowley 
A*. /d<U^ 
Ida Klaus 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL 
HYGIENE, WILLOWBROOK DEVELOPMENTAL CENTER, 
Respondent. 
-and-
DENIAL OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
CASE NO. U-2684 
THE CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC. (RONN A. BEN AAMAN), 
Charging Party. 
The charging party herein has moved this Board for the disquali-
fication of the hearing officer from further participation in this case. 
The accompanying Affidavit does not state grounds adequate to support the 
request made. 
ACCORDINGLY, the request is denied. 
DATED: New York, New York 
December 8, 1977 
(/Mjfr£-R CtglliJUU 
/foseph R. Crowley TT 
Jjla, A & 6 e ^ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF ARDSLEY, 
Employer, 
- and -
LOCAL 456, IBT, 
Petitioner. 
CASE NO. C-1524 
BOARD DECISION 
On July 29, 1977, Local 456, IBT (petitioner) filed, in accordance 
with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a 
timely petition for certification as the exclusive negotiating representative 
of certain employees employed by the Village of Ardsley. 
Thereafter, the parties entered into an agreement whereby a 
negotiating unit was stipulated to as follows: 
Included: Skilled laborers, laborers, mechanical 
equipment operators, mechanics and 
custodians. 
Excluded: CETA employees and all other employees. 
Pursuant to the agreement, a secret ballot election was held on 
November 16, 1977. The results of this election indicate that a majority 
of eligible voters in the stipulated unit who cast valid ballots do not 
XJ'<y\s 
- 2 
desire to be represented for purposes of collective negotiations by 
1/ 
the petitioner. 
/C&cu^^ 
Ida Klaus 
Dated: New York, New York 
December 8, 1977 
1/ There were 5 ballots cast in favor of representation by the 
petitioner and 5 ballots against representation by the petitioner. 
CrfYApi-; 
IL STATE OF NEW YORK #?.H-12/8/77 
-PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS Li- ,:.D 
I n the ' M a t t e r of 
TOWN OF ONTARIO, 
Employer, 
and 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. , 
P e t i t i o n e r . • 
CASE NO. C-1522 
CBRTTFTrSTTON OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter.by the Public Employment Relations Board in accor-
dance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected,-
Pursuant to the authority vested' in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act,' 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc. 
has been designated and selected by a majo'rity of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the'purpose of collective 
negotiations and the. settlement of grievances. , 
U n i t : I n c l u d e d : Road Foreman, Motor Equipment O p e r a t o r s , L a b o r e r s , 
Water P l a n t O p e r a t o r s , C l e r i c a l and S e c r e t a r i e s 
Exc luded: A s s e s s o r , R e c r e a t i o n D i r e c t o r , C o n f i d e n t i a l C l e r k , 
Deputy Town C le rk and Pa t ro lman 
F u r t h e r , I T i S ORDERED t h a t t h e a b o v e - n a m e d p u b l i c e m p l o y e r 
s h a l l n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h C i v i l S e r v i c e Employees A s s o c i a t i o n , Inc 
n d e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t , w i t h s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i s a t i o n 
w i t h r e g a r d t o t e r m s a n d c o n d i t i o n s o f e m p l o y m e n t , a n d s h a l l 
n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e • 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f , a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f , g r i e v a n c e s . 
S i g n e d , o n t h e 8 t h d a y o f December 1977 
New .York. New York 
V /J 
Joseph Crowley 
%urtk 
I d a Klaus 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS B 
-12/8/77 
In the Matter of 
ROTTERDAM DRAPER UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Employer, 
- and -
GENERAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES' UNION, S.E.I.U., 
AFL-CIO, LOCAL 200, 
Petitioner. 
CASE NO. C-1525 
CERTTFrca-TION-OF-REPKBSENTgTiyE-TAHD^Ol'iDER- TO'HSrE'GUTTAT'B 
A r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g h a v i n g b e e n c o n d u c t e d in t h e . 
a b o v e m a t t e r by t h e P u b l i c Employment R e l a t i o n s Board i n a c c o r -
d a n c e w i t h t h e P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r Employment A c t and t h e 
R u l e s of P r o c e d u r e o f t h e B o a r d , and i t a p p e a r i n g t h a t a 
n e g o t i a t i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e h a s b e e n s e l e c t e d ; . 
P u r s u a n t t o t h e a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d i n t h e Board by t h e 
P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r Employment A c t , 
, IT I S HEREBY CERTIFIED t h a t General Service Employees' Union 
S.E.I.U., AFL-CIO, Local 200 
h a s b e e n d e s i g n a t e d and s e l e c t e d by a, m a j o r i t y o f t h e e m p l o y e e s 
o f t h e above -named p u b l i c e m p l o y e r , i n t h e u n i t d e s c r i b e d b e l o w , 
a s t h e i r e x c l u s i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r t h e p u r p o s e of c o l l e c t i v e 
n e g o t i a t i o n s and t h e s e t t l e m e n t of g r i e v a n c e s . 
U n i t : Included: Ful l - t ime c lerk , t y p i s t , senior custodian, custodian, 
cleaner and school matron, f u l l and regular par t - t ime 
food service helper and cook. 
Excluded: All other employees. • . . 
F u r t h e r , IT I S ORDERED t h a t t h e above-named n u b l i c e m o l o y e r 
s h a l l ' n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h General Service Employees''iUnion 
S.E.I.U., :AFL-CI0, Local 200 
and e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t w i t h such emp loyee o r g a n i z a t i o n 
w i th r e g a r d t o t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s of emp loymen t , and s h a l l -
n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h such emp loyee o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e 
i e t e r m i n a t i o n o f , and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of , g r i e v a n c e s . 
i g n e d on t h e 8th ' d a y o f December 
New York, New York 
19 77.. 
MzU- t^Au*^-— 
Ida Klaus , 
ov\Jiy-
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STATE OF NKW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS n 
•#?T-12/8/77 
I n t h e Ma t t e r of 
TOWN OF TRENTON, 
Employer, 
and 
CASE NO.' C-1551 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 182, IBT, 
P e t i t i o n e r . 
— — — -&ERTT-F-TeA-'T^0N-6F-'R-EPR-ES-ENTftTTV-E-a-NB--0RDER-T0-NE 
, A r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g h a v i n g b e e n c o n d u c t e d i n t h e 
a b o v e , m a t t e r b y t h e P u b l i c E m p l o y m e n t R e l a t i o n s B o a r d i n a c c o r -
d a n c e w i t h t h e P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r E m p l o y m e n t A c t a n d t h e 
R u l e s o f P r o c e d u r e o f t h e B o a r d , a n d i t a p p e a r i n g t h a t a 
n e g o t i a t i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e h a s b e e n s e l e c t e d ; 
P u r s u a n t t o t h e - a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d i n ' t h e B o a r d b y t h e 
P u b l i c . E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r E m p l o y m e n t A c t , 
I T I S HEREBY • CERTIFIED t h a t Teamste rs Loca l 182, IBT 
h a s b e e n d e s i g n a t e d a n d s e l e c t e d b y a m a j o r i t y o f t h e ' e m p l o y e e s 
o f t h e a b o v e - n a m e d p u b l i c e m p l o y e r , - i n t h e u n i t d e s c r i b e d b e l o w , 
a s t h e i r e x c l u s i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f . c o l l e c t i v e 
n e g o t i a t i o n s a n d t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f g r i e v a n c e s . -
U n i t : I n c l u d e d : A l l employees of Highway Depar tment . 
Excluded: Highway s u p e r i n t e n d e n t , c l e r i c a l , s e a s o n a l and temporary 
employees . / 
F u r t h e r , I T I S ORDERED t h a t t h e a b o v e - n a m e d p u b l i c e m p l o y e r 
s h a l l n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h Teamster Loca l 182, IBT 
and e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t w i t h s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n 
tfith r e g a r d t o t e r m s a n d c o n d i t i o n s o f e m p l o y m e n t , a n d s h a l l 
l e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f , a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f , g r i e v a n c e s . 
i g n e d o n t h e 8 t h d a y o f December , 1 9 77 . 
New York, New York 
Jos'ep~h7R. Crowley 
I d a Klaus 
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STATE OF NEW YORK #2K- l ? /8 /77 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS B' AD 
I n t h e Ma t t e r of 
ARLINGTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
- and -
ARLINGTON ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION, 
P e t i t i o n e r , 
- and -
ARLINGTON TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
I n t e r v e n o r . 
CASE NO. c-144?. 
CERTIFTCATION-OF~REPRESBNTA~TIVE^T^ 
A r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g h a v i n g b e e n c o n d u c t e d i n t h e 
a b o v e m a t t e r b y t h e P u b l i c E m p l o y m e n t R e l a t i o n s B o a r d i n a c c o r -
d a n c e . w i t h t h e P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r E m p l o y m e n t Ac t . a n d t h e 
R u l e s o f P r o c e d u r e o f t h e B o a r d , a n d i t a p p e a r i n g t h a t a 
n e g o t i a t i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e h a s b e e n s e l e c t e d ; 
P u r s u a n t t o t h e a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d i n t h e B o a r d b y t h e 
P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r E m p l o y m e n t A c t , 
~i • • 
IT I S HEREBY CERTIFIED t h a t Arlington Administrators Association 
h a s b e e n d e s i g n a t e d and s e l e c t e d by a m a j o r i t y o f t h e employee 's 
o f t h e above -named p u b l i c e m p l o y e r , i n t h e u n i t d e s c r i b e d b e l o w , 
a s t h e i r e x c l u s i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r t h e ' p u r p o s e of c o l l e c t i v e 
n e g o t i a t i o n s and t h e s e t t l e m e n t of g r i e v a n c e s . 
U n i t : Included: P r inc ipa l , Assistant P r inc ipa l , Elementary Teacher Assis tant 
to the Pr inc ipa l . 
Excluded: All other employees. 
F u r t h e r , IT IS ORDERED t h a t t h e above-named p u b l i c errrplcysr 
s b a l l n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c i i i ' e l y w i t h Arlington Administrators Association 
and e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t w i t h s u c h emp loyee o r g a n i z a t i o n 
v i t h r e g a r d t o t e r m s and c o n d i t i o n s of employmen t , and s h a l l 
n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h such e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of , and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of , g r i e v a n c e s . 
S i g n e d on t h e 8th d a y .of 
New York, New York 
December 19 77 . 
Josepj/'R. Crowley 
Q 
^W^ 
U'L Ida Klaus 
'PERB 50 
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STATE OF NEW YORK #2"" 12/8/77-
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS B. .AD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF KINGSTON, 
Employer, 
- and 
CASE NO. C-1535 
ULSTER COUNTY LOCAL, CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. , 
P e t i t i o n e r . 
-GBRT-I-F-I-<3AT-I-GN-QF-REPR-ESENTATIVE--ANB-ORBER-TO-NESeT-I-aTE-
Unit I : i n c l u d e d : 
Exc luded: 
J n i t I I : I n c l u d e d : 
A r e p r e s e n t a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g h a v i n g b e e n c o n d u c t e d i n t h e . 
a b o v e m a t t e r b y t h e P u b l i c E m p l o y m e n t R e l a t i o n s B o a r d i n a c c o r -
d a n c e w i t h t h e P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ' ' F a i r E m p l o y m e n t A c t a n d t h e 
R u l e s o f P r o c e d u r e o f t h e B o a r d , a n d i t a p p e a r i n g t h a t a 
n e g o t i a t i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e h a s b e e n s e l e c t e d , -
P u r s u a n t t o t h e a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d i n t h e B o a r d b y t h e 
P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r E m p l o y m e n t A c t , 
I T I S HEREBY C E R T I F I E D t h a t U l s t e r County L o c a l , C i v i l S e r v i c e 
Employees A s s o c i a t i o n , I n c . . 
h a s b e e n d e s i g n a t e d a n d s e l e c t e d b y a m a j o r i t y o f t h e e m p l o y e e s 
o f t h e a b o v e - n a m e d p u b l i c e m p l o y e r , i n t h e u n i t d e s c r i b e d b e l o w , 
a s t h e i r e x c l u s i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r t h e ' p u r p o s e o f c o l l e c - c i v e 
n e g o t i a t i o n s a n d t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f g r i e v a n c e s . 
A l l employees of t h e C i ty of Kingston Labora to ry who 
r e g u l a r l y work a t l e a s t 18% h o u r s weekly-
D i r e c t o r ; A s s i s t a n t D i r e c t o r , A s s o c i a t e D i r e c t o r , Chief 
T e c h n i c i a n , L a b o r a t o r y Manager, B iochemis t , A d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
S e c r e t a r y , employees i nc luded w i t h i n t h e Supe rv i so ry U n i t , 
and a l l o t h e r employees 
The f o l l o w i n g employees of t h e C i t y ' o f Kings ton L a b o r a t o r y : 
J u n i o r Chemist , . Hematology S u p e r v i s o r , immunohematologist . , 
Mic rob io logy S u p e r v i s o r , Cytology S u p e r v i s o r , C l i n i c a l 
Chemist ry S u p e r v i s o r , Off ice Manager, Medical Accounts 
S u p e r v i s o r , Head J a n i t o r , L a b o r a t o r y Aid C o o r d i n a t o r . 
Exc luded: A l l o t h e r employees 
F u r t h e r , I T I S ORDERED t h a t t h e a b o v e - n a m e d p u b l i c e m p l o y e r 
s h a l l n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h U l s t e r County L o c a l , C i v i l S e r v i c e 
Employees A s s o c i a t i o n , I n c . . < . 
a n d e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t w i t h s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n 
v ' i t h r e g a r d t o t e r m s a n d c o n d i t i o n s o f e m p l o y m e n t , a n d s h a l l 
l e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e 
3 e t e r m i n a t i o n o f , a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f , g r i e v a n c e s . 
S i g n e d o n t h e 8 t h d a y o f December , 19 77 . 
New York, New York 
5012 Ida Klaus 
